mists and political scientists have expanded their field of inquiry. Economists have become crucial figures in the analysis of governmental policy, especially in the measurement and an·alysis of governmental effectiveness through the methodology of cost-benefit analysis.2 Political scientists have at the same time shifted their focus toward nongovernmental institutions, with some analyzing what were once thought to be nonpolitical governmental institutions (e.g., schools) and others, nongovernments (e.g., private governments). As Mancur Olson has recently observed, the social science disciplines differ by their approaches and theoretical frameworks rather than by their subject matter. 3 Thus libraries, be they primarily publicly or privately operated, are fair game for the frameworks of political scientists and economists.
Each discipline includes an array of theoretical frameworks. The overall ap-0 My frequent co-author, Robert Shishko, has tried to impart the essence of cost-benefit analyses to his audience by telling them about an economist who, when asked if he liked sex, replied immediately, "What are the alternatives?" I thank Bob Shishko for helping me to learn enough about economic analysis to criticize it, and I thank David Schulz and Daniel Rich for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
_ ,
• > proach of systems analysis stands out within each discipline as a fruitful way to improve libraries, specifically costbenefit analysis in economics and Eastonian systems analysis in political science. EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS

Brief Description
"Basically, economic analysis is the study of choice: the allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses, and the distribution of outputs among alternative uses-that is, the classic questions of what and how much to produce, and who gets what products. '' 4 Cost-benefit analysis is a subfield of economic analysis: a specific application of economic analysis to nonmarket activity. We have defined cost-benefit analysis as the analytical examination of the costs and benefits of alternatives designed to meet specified objectives under various contingencies or states of the world. 5 Some differentiate cost-benefit analysis from cost-effectiveness analysis; the former referring to long-range financial effects (e.g., increased dollar income) and the latter to short-range measured output in nonfinancial terms (e.g., number of books circulated) . 6 Although systems analysis has been used to refer to cost-benefit analyses, because its use is much more widespread, having application in areas from computer technology to political analysis, we define systems analysis as the study of systems or complexes or organized and interrelated parts, in terms of inputs, outputs, and internal functioning. 7 Our definition of cost-benefit analysis has already included most of the elements of the basic analytical framework: costs, benefits, alternatives, and contingencies. What then is cost-benefit analysis? It is a way of looking at the world. Usually one starts from a set of objectives that a decision maker has in mind. The analyst finds measures of the Library Decision Making I 413 extent to which the objectives may be met. For example, if an objective of a library were to provide reading material to library users, then one measure of meeting this objective would be annual book circulation. One then examines the alternatives for fulfilling each objective.
By constructing models (e.g., formulas, computer simulations), the analyst relates each alternative to its corresponding costs and benefits (i.e., the degree to which objectives are met). The model is used across several contingencies or states of the world. Given the costs and benefits associated with each alternative in each contingency, a criterion or measure of preferredness (e.g., maximizing profits) is selected and the "best" alternative is chosen. Figure 1 illustrates the cost-benefit procedure. Note that the method is actually circular-objectives are revised in light of feasibility and costs, new alternatives are created, models are refined, and the decision process is continuously in motion.
Brief Critique
The elements of the cost-benefit analysis model serve as the basis for a brief critique of the method. Attempts to define library objectives can lead to clarifications of purpose, yet they often result in futile searches for well-hidden goals obscuring the true clients of the library. 8 While efforts to generate alternatives to perform library services more efficiently and effectively are made, the question of the practicality and feasibility of radically different ideas weights the ultimate analysis against innovative options. Relating costs to alternatives becomes the key task, and numbers generated through cost modeling become the foci of economy drives. Benefit modeling, however, is weakest when the alternatives are most innovative, e.g., public library programs based r:::J
The Basic Cost-Benefit Framework on distributing paperback books for disadvantaged patrons, university libraries handing out free copies of required articles to students. 9 Because the contingencies studied most are those thought · to affect costs, not benefits, inflation of prices is emphasized over inflation of goals in serving users.
Each of these difficulties is related to the political context in which the economic study is conceived, implemented, and received. The basic political problem with economic analysis transcends operational and day-to-day difficulties and political intrigue. The basic political problem centers on political conflict inherent in all our institutions, including libraries. It is this conflict that is inappropriately dealt with or ignored in economic analysi~. can be specified at some point to the satisfaction of the decision maker. Costbenefit analysts recognize that multiple objectives may exist and suggest that the tradeoffs, the extent to which meeting one objective leads to a failure to meet other objectives, be specified and clearly displayed. But did our analysis indicate objectives that could be agreed upon?
The Political Problem with Economic
We decided to present the data on alternatives derived from our analysis to the individual members of the university community, thus to allow each to act as if he or she were the ultimate decision maker. 12 Because it would have been too costly to reach all members of the community, we drew a random sample of undergraduate students, graduate students, and faculty and research staff and presented them with twenty alternative changes, with a brief description of costs .and relevant benefit considerations, for the M.I.T. libraries. Respondents were given budgets of $0, $100,000, and $200,000 to spend for changes in the libraries.
The analysis of the survey clearly indicates that different subgroups of the M.I.T. community either had different objectives in mind or viewed different means as being best for meeting common objectives:
The general conclusion is that the three major campus groups differ in the systems they would like the library to adopt. Undergraduates seek to expand and centralize the reserve collection by cutting research services. Graduate students add lower Xerox prices and increased access to this list of desired systems and would prefer to cut seating rather than cataloging. The faculty are the most willing to alter Library Decision Making I 415 book storage and cataloging and relativefy less desirous of a centralized reserve system ....
The less a respondent reported using the libraries the more likely he was to select saving money on book storage and seating and to spend it on lower Xerox rates, departmental libraries, and an all-Xerox reserve system. Low users thus tend to be outside-use oriented. The high users prefer expanding seating, acquisitions, reference, and access to other collections. The high users thus are research oriented. We have concluded that the library has traditionally served one clientele, the research oriented. There now appears to be, however, a second clientele, who spend few hours in the library and seek not the space but the materials in its collection. We believe, with as yet no proof, that many of those oriented to outside use prefer to work outside the library but are forced, primarily by the reserve system, to work in the library. We hypothesize that these users (and many other potential users) could be served by a library emphasizing distribution as well as in-house facilities and services. 13 The M.I.T. analysis indicates that the alternatives faced by the M.I.T. library and university administrators involved major choices among various subgroups on campus. Furthermore, the analysis strongly suggests that decisions now favor faculty far more than students.
The political problem with economic analysis is that there is no economic way to resolve differences among alternatives meeting different objectives held by different subgroups; where political conflict exists a political solution must be found. 14 This is not news to most economists. What library decision makers require is help in resolving these political conflicts. Presumably political analysis can help.
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Political scientists would not agree on the nature of analysis necessary to deal with such political conflict. Some would argue that an analysis should begin with a positivist or descriptive analysis of libraries with a focus on who decides and by what process. Others would argue that an explicitly normative or value based analysis, with a major focus on issues of equity and responsiveness, is required. Because neither of these approaches has been applied' to libraries, a first step falling between the normative and positive poles of political systems analysis has been chosen here. Below, David Easton's descriptive framework is used to raise the normative questions which library decision makers should be addressing. 15 Easton defines politics as the authoritative allocation of values for a society. In the past, many governmental institutions, perhaps education is the best example, have been viewed as being outside of the realm of politics. In 1969, in an introduction to a reader on the politics of education, the editor stated that "The idea that politics and public education are intimately related was practically unthinkable as recently as a decade ago. . . . At the very lea~t, any governmental process involving authoritative decisions on matters of public relevance is of a political nature." 16 Thus an entire literature dealing with the politics of education has developed. 17 Certainly it would not be inappropriate to raise issues concerning the politics of public libraries and libraries at public universities.
Studying the politics of university libraries derives from another expansion of political analysis to the area of private government. 18 Public governments have been defined as "those general as well as special-purpose associations and agencies either to which all inhabitants of a given locality are subject or of which all citizens are members"; and private governments are "those limitedpurpose associations or organizations, usually voluntary in membership, which exist both alongside and subordinate to public governments." 19 Examples of private governments are corporations, trade unions, professional associations, and universities. Indeed, the public versus private distinction has become increasingly blurred, especially as applied to universities, within the past decade.2o
The
Easton's Framework for Political Analysis
Easton's model (see Figure 2) is simple in its conception but complex in its full description. Dye describes the theoretical framework succinctly:
One way to conceive of public policy is to think of it as a response of a political system to forces brought to bear upon it from the environment. Forces generated in the environment which affect the political system are viewed as inputs. The environment is any condition or circumstance defined as external to the boundaries of the political · system. The political system is that group of interrelated structures and processes which functions authoritatively to allocate values for a society. Outputs of the political system are authoritative value allocations of the system, and these allocations constitute public policy.
Systems theory portrays public policy as an output of the political system. The concept of "system" implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that function to transform demands into authoritative decisions requiring the support of society. The concept of "systems" also implies that elements of the system are interrelated, that the system can respond to forces in its environment, and that it will do so in order to preserve itself. Inputs are received into the political system in the form of both demands and support. Demands occur when individuals or groups, in response to real or perceived environmental conditions, act to affect public policy. Support is rendered when individuals or groups accept the outcome of elections, obey the laws, pay their taxes, and generally conform to policy decisions. Any system absorbs a variety of demands, some of which conflict with each other. In order to transform these demands into outputs (public policies) , it must arrange settlements and enforce these settlements upon the parties concerned. It is recognized that outputs (public policies) may have a modifying effect on the environment and the demands arising from it, and may also have an effect upon the character of the political system. The system preserves itself by: ( 1) producing reasonably satisfying outputs, ( 2) relying upon deeply rooted attachments to the system itself, and ( 3) using, or threatening to use force.2 4 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
System Boundaries and Legitimacy
The first question that arises is whether we can determine the boundaries of a political system. Throughout the M.I.T. library study we felt too constrained by the definition of the system we were studying, "the M.I.T. libraries." The use and evaluation of a university library are not independent of the book stores within (and without) the university. To declare one a legitimate item for analysis and the other as outside of the area of analysis may be to miss the dynamics of the situation. It was surprising to discover that a high-level, library acquisitions department staff member had not only made no effort to buy books from the Harvard Coop but also had never even been to this store, one of the world's largest bookstores. We were surprised to receive veiled threats by a department chairman after we had measured his departmental library's floor-space without his permission. The quality of departmental libraries must surely determine the nature and degree of use of the main libraries. What units should be included in the library decision maker's domain?
Output and Benefits
Unlike Easton, it seems that the most fruitful political analysis must begin with the output stage of the political process. The analysis of output, done within the cost-benefit framework of the M.I.T. study, provides some significant information and raises some important questions.
The best tool available for analyzing policy was ( and often is) the library budget. But budgets are usually input based (e.g., cost of books purchased, cost of personnel salaries) rather than output or policy derived (e.g., cost of providing student services for coursework). Perhaps even more interesting, the M.I.T. library budget, divided into parts among discipline-related libraries, was considered confidential. To paraphrase one 'library administrator, "If the social scientists knew what we were spending on the physical science library, they'd start asking for more funds."
A program budget analysis of the M.I.T. library seems to show quite clearly who benefits from the current decision-making system. Only 23 percent of the total budget is used for providing required reading and facilities for studying, i.e., 'less than a quarter of the budget is devoted to nonresearch, courserelated studerit services. Of course, this overstates the antistudent bias, for undergraduate and particularly graduate students devote much effort to research both inside and outside of courses.
As noted in the discussion of the cost-benefit analysis of the M.I.T. libraries, the survey analysis challenges the myth of a unitary community. 25 In fact it suggests that the allocation of benefits, if not costs, is weighted in favor of faculty and staff. Why should this be so?
Demand and Democratic Process
The concept of demand is a crucial one in Easton's framework. An analysis of demands made upon library administrators at M.I.T. would probably indicate that a small number of senior faculty are the primary demanders. The library advisory committee contained no students; the administrators themselves spoke almost entirely of faculty complaints. 26 What channels, both formal and informal, are required for those affected by decisions concerning libraries to be adequately heard?
The concept of demands is too limited for the political analysis of quasipublic institutions like university libraries. Few preferences, defined as desired states of affairs, even reach the level of demands. Easton concentrates on the reasons for the weeding of demands and the attrition of preferences in the input stage of the political process. We should ask, as does Easton, what institutions exist to filter and channel demands to library decision makers? How successful are different kinds of people within the university community in making their demands heard? To what extend should access be equalized?
The mobilization of bias should also be considered crucial by library analysts. Several political scientists have criticized their discipline for the substantive conclusion that American institutions are open and responsive to minority groups. 27 They argue that this optimistic substantive conclusion derives in part from a methodological problem, analyzing only decisions made by public bodies. Backrach and Baratz ask, "Can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively noncontroversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals?" 28 By limiting political analysis to overt decisions, the role that elites play in mobilizing bias, i.e., in defining the nature and states of the political game, is overlooked. The mobilization of bias plays a critical role in library policy. One of our early suggestions at M.I.T. was that the price of reproducing pages of library materials within M.I.T.'s libraries should be reduced. Although the price was later decreased, the action was based upon an agreement that decreasing the price would ultimately increase revenue (i.e., elastic demand) and the system would remain self-supporting. But why should the dissemination of information by copying be self-supporting, and who is disadvantaged by this decision rule? Whereas many faculty have research grants, departmental resources, and relatively high incomes, students are at a relative disadvantage in the marketplace. Libraries do not break even on providing books. Shoul~ they break even on copying materials for dissemination?
One economist has made an argument that could have been based on the mobilization of bias concept:
Or why do not librarians diminish their stock of hard-cover books and acquire in their stead substantial inventories of paperbacks which they would then give away free? We are inclined to reply, "Why, that would be crazy: our budget would soon be exhausted." And yet that is exactly what librarians are doing now except instead of giving books away free they are giving staff services away free. 29 Keller calls for implicit (or explicit) pricing of library services. 30 Easton's framework, indeed all political frameworks, should include a basic economic concept of exit. Hirschman argues that one mechanism of voicing disapproval within the political as well as economic sector is exit, e.g., leaving the organization or not consuming the product. 31 To what extent do poLibrary Dec. ision Making I 419 tential library users seek other sources of information because of library ineffectiveness? To what extent do some groups lack an effective means of influencing library decision makers by their inability to exit?
The larger question that each of these points concerning demand raises is the appropriateness of democratic norms fo· r library decision making. Should libraries be run more democratically than they now are?
Decision Making and Selecting Decision Makers
The analysis of decisions and decision makers is a crucial aspect of Easton's framework The analysis of library decision making must reach beyond the traditional organizational bounds of the exercise of rationality. Lakoff has expressed the criticisms of traditional organizational analysis as follows:
The study of organizational decisionmaking studiously avoids asking the kind · of questions that would render the · study of decision-making genuinely political. It does not ask what constituencies are involved, or how the legislative is related to the executive, or how the authority of the decisionmaker is made accountable to those he represents. It does not ask whether the system is constitutional or just, legitimate or illegitimate. Instead the study of decision-making in organizations is confined to the question of whether and to what extent the functions of management are exercised ration~.lly. The stress, in other words, is clearly on administration rather than government, on the integrative func-' tion of social organization, on improving the efficiency of the decision-maker. There is pnictically no attention paid to the question of whether people who are members of the ox:ganization or who are served by it have or ought to have control over it, whether they have any right (a term which would probably be considered altogether un-scientific by students of organization) to be consulted in the decision-making process or indeed to decide what form the process will take. 32 In this conventional sense, the study of organizations, despite its focus on decision making, has been quite apolitical.
Dye's identification of barriers limiting rational decision making, in many ways analogous to criticisms of the use of cost-benefit analysis in libraries, might serve as a starting point for an analysis of library decision making. They are restated below as hypotheses.
1. There are no community values which are usually agreed upon, but only the values of specific groups and individuals, many of which are conflicting. 2. The many conflicting values cannot be compared or weighted: for example, it is impossible to compare or weight the value of individual dignity against the loss of rare books. 3. The environment of library policy makers, particularly the power and influence system, renders it impossible for them to see or accurately weight many community values, particularly those values which have no active or powerful proponents. 4. Library policy makers are not motivated to make decisions on the basis of community goals, but instead try to maximize their own rewards-power, status, money, etc. 5. Library policy makers are not motivated to maximize net goal achievement, but merely to satisfy demands for progress; they do not search until they find "the one best way" but halt their search when they find an alternative which "will work." 6. Large investments in existing programs and policies (e.g., catalog- Woodrow Wilson, asked whether he had much difficulty in accustoming himself to practical politics, stated that after his experience in university politics at Princeton everything else seemed simple. It is time that we all recognized the politics of libraries and acted accordingly.
